Governance of Smart Contracts in Blockchain Institutions

Bronwyn E. Howell, P. Potgieter
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

We consider some of the techno-economic characteristics of smart contracts relating to real-world transactions, and the effectiveness of the governance regimes in which they will operate. We find that the requirement to code the precise executable steps ex ante in smart contracts necessitates a degree of precision and foresight about potential future eventualities that is unprecedented in all but the simplest of real-world interactions. The rules-based approach necessitated by pre-programming all transactions anticipates a state where complete contracting is feasible, so is not well-suited to transactions in real-world environments where unexpected outcomes can arise. This stands in direct contrast to the well-developed principles-based governance frameworks offered under contract law and the courts, which have developed ways to specifically address issues of contractual incompleteness. Thus despite objectives for blockchain-governed institutional (or even constitutional) frameworks to operate as fully self-contained environments within which all commercial interactions can be mediated via smart contracts, the inherent incompleteness of contracts due to limits to information availability, human cognition and communication renders such objectives illusory. A role will continue to exist for the real-world contract governance institutions as a complement to blockchain governance arrangements. Smart contracts may be suitable for routine, low-value highly-standardised and easily-coded spot transactions with predetermined outcomes and executed within a short time horizon of agreement taking place. However, the more complex and unique is the transaction, the higher is the value at risk, the harder it is to anticipate and precisely specify contingencies and measure and observe outcomes, and the longer is the time frame between agreement and execution, the less likely it is that smart contracting will be more efficient than real-world contracting. Indeed, in many cases a smart contract may prove more costly to administer.
区块链机构中智能合约的治理
我们考虑了与现实世界交易相关的智能合约的一些技术经济特征,以及它们将在其中运作的治理制度的有效性。我们发现,在智能合约中预先编写精确的可执行步骤的需求需要一定程度的精确度和对潜在未来可能性的预见,这在除了最简单的现实世界交互之外的所有交互中都是前所未有的。预先对所有事务进行编程所必需的基于规则的方法预期了完全契约是可行的状态,因此不太适合可能出现意外结果的现实环境中的事务。这与合同法和法院提供的完善的基于原则的治理框架形成了直接对比,后者已经开发出具体解决合同不完备问题的方法。因此,尽管区块链治理的机构(甚至宪法)框架的目标是作为完全独立的环境运行,在这个环境中,所有的商业互动都可以通过智能合约进行调解,但由于信息可用性、人类认知和沟通的限制,合同的固有不完整性使这些目标变得虚幻。现实世界的契约治理机构将继续发挥作用,作为区块链治理安排的补充。智能合约可能适用于常规的、低价值的、高度标准化的、易于编码的现货交易,这些交易具有预定的结果,并在协议发生后的短时间内执行。然而,交易越复杂和独特,风险价值就越高,预测和精确指定突发事件、衡量和观察结果就越困难,协议和执行之间的时间框架越长,智能合约就越不可能比现实世界的合约更有效。事实上,在许多情况下,智能合约的管理成本可能更高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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