«Dobrudzhan Catastrophy» as a reflection of Russian-Romanian military-political relations in summer–autumn period of 1916.

Abstract

Romania’s entry into the First World War was considered by Russian military-political leadership primarily from the point of view of its own military interests, without taking into account possible negative consequences and prospects of Russian-Romanian military cooperation. According to General Headquarters' estimations, Romanian army attacks in Transylvania, together with Thessaloniki Allied army actions, were to restrain considerable enemy forces and thus ensured the success of Russian army attacks. At the same time, in spite of the fiercest battles on the SWF, the enemy succeeded in forming two new armies in Transylvania by creating a qualitative and quantitative advantage against the 1st and the 2nd Romanian armies operating at this region. When in mid-September of 1916 the need for direct military assistance to Romanian army became obvious for General Alekseyev, who was the immediate Russian army commander, he did not have enough will to insist on his decision. Thus, the South-Western Front attack, which had lost its military significance by that time, was continued. As a result, the plan of military aid to Romania, embodied by General Headquarters, was essentially defensive, and included only indirect assistance, in the form of limited 9th Russian Army attacks from Northern Moldova, and a slight strengthening of the Dobrudzhan army. In addition to this, the incorrect assessment of the situation, both by Russian and Romanian military forces, was obvious. A long pause in enemy's activity in the south, caused by waiting for reinforcements, and enemy's activity in the north, instilled confidence that the main attack would come from there. As a result, all Romanian reserves from the South were transferred to the North, while the enemy struck in the South in Dobrudzh. When Russian General Headquarters realized the consequences of Chernovody-Constanza railway loss, it simply could not transfer Russian military reserves in time. Thus, the lack of coherence between Russian and Romanian sides and their allies, the pursuit of each side's selfish interests led to the loss of military initiative by the allies in Romania, which was completely transferred to the enemy.