Global Arms Production and Ukraine’s Unpredictable Soviet Inheritance

Orysia Kulick
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Abstract

Abstract Ukraine is very much a part of the global arms trade – both as a producer of components of military hardware, as well as a source of illicit weapons fuelling conflicts worldwide. The latter development has in fact become worse since the outbreak of war in the Donbass in 2014. Part of this connectivity to global markets is bound up in the country’s Soviet inheritance, a vast network of military-industrial facilities that underpinned defence production in the 1950s-1980s. The Soviets were then engaged in a power struggle with the West over geopolitical influence, military superiority and, of course, nuclear parity. A far less understood consequence of this focus on defence was its impact on Soviet politics, particularly the rising prominence of regional economic elites from southeastern Ukraine, who came to be disproportionately represented in the Kremlin under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. This article examines this inheritance in three parts. The first maps out how changing economic and security priorities after Stalin laid the groundwork for regional elites in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Donetsk, and Kharkiv to cluster in significant ways, fundamentally altering the political landscape of the Soviet Union. The second part examines how that landscape was changed by the dissolution of the union and independence in 1991, in particular, how denuclearization, reforms to the defence sector and privatization altered the relationship of regional economic elites to centres of power in Moscow and Kyiv and made the emergence of the oligarchs possible. The third and final part examine continuities between past and present as it pertains to the current historical moment, specifically lingering infrastructural concerns and conflicts of interest that precipitated a major conflict between the Soviet Union’s two largest successor states.
全球武器生产和乌克兰不可预测的苏联遗产
乌克兰是全球武器贸易的重要组成部分,既是军事硬件部件的生产国,也是助长全球冲突的非法武器的来源。自2014年顿巴斯爆发战争以来,后一种情况实际上变得更糟。这种与全球市场的联系部分与苏联的遗产有关,这是一个庞大的军事工业设施网络,在20世纪50年代至80年代支撑了国防生产。当时,苏联与西方就地缘政治影响力、军事优势,当然还有核均势展开了权力斗争。这种对国防的关注带来了一个鲜为人知的后果,那就是它对苏联政治的影响,尤其是对乌克兰东南部地区经济精英日益突出的影响。在尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫(Nikita Khrushchev)和列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫(Leonid Brezhnev)的领导下,这些人在克里姆林宫的代表比例过高。本文将分三部分研究这种继承。第一部分描绘了斯大林为第聂伯罗彼得罗夫斯克、基辅、顿涅茨克和哈尔科夫的地区精英奠定基础后,经济和安全优先事项的变化如何以重要的方式聚集在一起,从根本上改变了苏联的政治格局。第二部分考察了1991年联邦解体和独立如何改变了这一格局,特别是无核化、国防部门改革和私有化如何改变了地区经济精英与莫斯科和基辅权力中心的关系,并使寡头的出现成为可能。第三部分也是最后一部分考察了过去和现在之间的连续性,因为它与当前的历史时刻有关,特别是挥之不去的基础设施问题和利益冲突,这些冲突促成了苏联两个最大的继承国之间的重大冲突。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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