Smart Cities as “Big Brother Only to the Masses”: The Limits of Personal Privacy and Personal Surveillance

Masa Galic
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Abstract

Smart city projects in Europe and North America are employing a novel approach to data analysis that processes hardly any or no personal data at all. As such, these projects—at least, for the most part—escape the scope of (European) data protection law. The idea behind this new approach to smartness can be condensed in the statement: “smart cities are only Big Brother to the masses.” In other words, if the data collected within smart city projects do not identify any individuals, then there are no issues with privacy and data protection law. This problematic assumption relies on two reductive understandings of key notions in this context: that of “personal privacy” and “personal surveillance.” In this contribution, I focus on the latter and call for a broader understanding of surveillance as a set of diverse modes of social control by privacy law scholars. After all, in order to reveal the underlying dynamics of power and how these might lead to surveillance abuse—even, or especially, when surveillance is based on the processing of seemingly non-personal data—concrete surveillance practices and their logics need to be examined. For this purpose, I take the example of the Stratumseind Living Lab in the Netherlands and examine it through the lens of Foucault’s notion of security. This examination leads to two valuable insights for privacy and data protection law scholars. First of all, it strengthens the argument of contemporary group privacy scholars that a narrow focus on individual privacy and surveillance is inadequate and that the regulatory framework needs to be adapted. The second insight raises another broad issue: smart cities, which function according to the securitizing logic of surveillance, such as the Stratumseind Living Lab, are transforming public spaces into consumption spaces. Yet, the protection of privacy in public can and should serve to protect key aspects of public space—political participation and sociability—as well.
智慧城市是“大众的老大哥”:个人隐私与个人监控的极限
欧洲和北美的智慧城市项目正在采用一种新颖的数据分析方法,几乎不处理任何或根本不处理个人数据。因此,这些项目——至少在大多数情况下——逃脱了(欧洲)数据保护法的范围。这种智慧新方法背后的理念可以浓缩为一句话:“智慧城市只是大众的老大哥。”换句话说,如果在智慧城市项目中收集的数据没有识别任何个人,那么就不存在隐私和数据保护法的问题。这个有问题的假设依赖于对“个人隐私”和“个人监视”这两个关键概念的简化理解。在这篇文章中,我将重点放在后者,并呼吁隐私法学者更广泛地理解监控是一套不同的社会控制模式。毕竟,为了揭示权力的潜在动态,以及这些可能如何导致监控滥用——甚至,特别是,当监控是基于对看似非个人数据的处理时——具体的监控实践及其逻辑需要进行检查。为此,我以荷兰的Stratumseind生活实验室为例,通过福柯的安全概念来审视它。这一研究为隐私和数据保护法学者带来了两个有价值的见解。首先,它强化了当代群体隐私学者的观点,即狭隘地关注个人隐私和监控是不够的,监管框架需要调整。第二个观点提出了另一个广泛的问题:根据监控的证券化逻辑运作的智能城市,如Stratumseind生活实验室,正在将公共空间转变为消费空间。然而,在公共场合保护隐私可以也应该保护公共空间的关键方面——政治参与和社交。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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