On the natural basis and ecological limits of recognition

Abstract

In this chapter, we will discuss the idea that social recognition requires natural resources, and examine its natural, ecological, or environmental aspects. We argue against a view, which would conceptualize social recognition (respect, esteem, trust etc) as conceptually and ontologically independent of its natural basis, which is captured nicely in Richard Sennett’s question “Unlike food, respect costs nothing. Why, then should it be in short supply?” We first examine the way in which recognition was materially mediated in Hegel’s dialectics of Master and Slave, and then proceed to analyze in more detail what mutual recognition is and in what sense it requires natural resources. It turns out that different forms of recognition are very deeply rooted in material redistribution, and satisfactory relations of recognition in a “society of equals” may require very radical global redistribution. We then raise the stakes by connecting recognition not only with social justice but environmental and ecological justice. We conclude by bringing up the notion of planetary limits. 1. “Unlike food, respect costs nothing. Why, then should it be in short supply?” 1.1. Sennett’s slogan vs. Hegel’s Master and Slave Richard Sennett has asked: “Unlike food, respect costs nothing. Why, then should it be in short supply?”. The question is important as such, as there certainly are mechanisms that prevent us from giving each other due recognition when we could materially or economically afford it.1 There may be psychological and existential “costs” such as having to admit one’s own vulnerability and dependence, and there may be human tendencies not to make any such admissions. We will not focus on such “costs” here. The idea that “respect costs nothing” expresses a view that social recognition (respect, esteem, trust etc) is conceptually and ontologically independent of its natural or material basis. It is a rather disembodied, unencumbered view of recognition, and we wish to contest it here. Hegel’s famous dialectic of the master and the slave communicates a vivid image of the material basis of recognition: in a struggle of life and death, it comes apparent that a dead person cannot give recognition.2 Mutual recognition costs at least as much as keeping someone alive. Of course, if the other already has plenty of resources, it may not cost in practice anything for me to form a relationship of mutual recognition – which creates the image that it costs nothing. Hegel further notes that the relationship between the master and the slave is materially mediated: the master holds the slave in chains, and the slave works on the material environment for the master.3 There are theories of recognition that have insightfully stressed this natural and embodied basis of recognition, drawing on Hegel (Deranty 2009, Testa 2009). Let us approach this in two steps: by asking what recognition is (1.2, 1.3), and then by asking what direct and indirect ways 1 See e.g. Ikäheimo, 2014. 2 Hegel 1977 [1807] 3 Orlando Patterson (1982) in his classic “Slavery and Social Death” points out that historically speaking concerning real slaves work need not have been the main motivation behind slavery. Slaves have not always worked, as sometimes they have been more like status symbols for the slaveowners Published in Kahlos M., Koskinen, H.J. & Palmén R. (eds) Recognition and Religion. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-036-7133-59-7. 2019. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429026089