The Logic of the Uncanny: On the Role of Uncanny and Representation in Hal Foster's Analysis of Surrealism

Abstract

Hal Foster shares his basic stance with Rosalind Krauss in the analysis of Surrealism. He focus is internal criticism of Surrealists; the common writing style and Automatism agreed by Surrealist Manifesto are quite inappropriate for the expression of paintings. And he accommodates uncanny logic to solve this problem. Uncanny is an ontological panic associated with the accidental revealing of something fundamentally oppressed. The purpose of this discussion is to reappraise about the logic of the uncanny in Foster's Surrealism to supplement for the problem of representation that he could not analysis. This is representation and representational images were a fundamental and important expression of Surrealism that sought to realize the interpretation of dreams. For this discussion, we suggest the internal contradiction of Surrealism along Foster and Krauss. Furthermore, we reveal that the fundamental part of this internal contradictions is matter of representation, which is ontologically a problem of self-identity and a problem of narcissistic double and likeness as presented in Freud's analysis of the uncanny. Finally, it uses this as a basis for a reinterpretation of the uncanny logic employed in Foster's analysis of surrealism.