Adverse selection and moral hazard on network platform of science and technology papers published based on principal-agent theory

Abstract

Under the environment of service-driven property of network technology development, scientific papers published via network platform has become reality. With the development of platform, the academic quality of the papers on the platform become bottleneck, and “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” are the main reason which affect the academic quality of scientific papers in the platform. As a result, this article start from the “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” problem during the process of scientific papers published via network platform, and explored and analysed the causes and mechanism of academic quality. In this paper, we also set up a theoretic model of incentive cost and analyze the condition of effectiveness of incentive. Based on the theory of principal-agent, the sum of the agent cost and supervisor cost is equated to incentive cost in the platform with asymmetric information is hold.