Endogenous Market Structure and Technology Licensing

IF 1.5 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Japanese Economic Review Pub Date : 2016-07-26 DOI:10.1111/jere.12111

Chin-Sheng Chen

引用次数: 20

Abstract

This paper analyses the optimal licensing strategy of a licensor firm that competes with potential licensee firms in an industry with endogenous entry. The optimal licensing strategy of the licensor firm is to have zero royalty and positive fixed fees, which is a result that sharply contrasts with the existing literature whereby licensor firms tend to charge positive royalties to their rival licensees. Under the optimal licensing strategy, the licensor firm and the licensee firms are active in the market, but not the non-licensed firms. This equilibrium market structure is socially desirable if the fixed production cost is not too small.

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内生市场结构与技术许可

本文分析了在具有内生进入的行业中，许可企业与潜在许可企业竞争时的最优许可策略。许可公司的最佳许可策略是零版税和正固定费用，这与现有文献中许可公司倾向于向其竞争对手收取正版税的结果形成鲜明对比。在最优许可策略下，许可企业和被许可企业在市场上是活跃的，而非许可企业则不活跃。如果固定生产成本不太小，这种均衡市场结构是社会所期望的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Japanese Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Started in 1950 by a group of leading Japanese economists under the title The Economic Studies Quarterly, the journal became the official publication of the Japanese Economic Association in 1959. As its successor, The Japanese Economic Review has become the Japanese counterpart of The American Economic Review, publishing substantial economic analysis of the highest quality across the whole field of economics from researchers both within and outside Japan. It also welcomes innovative and thought-provoking contributions with strong relevance to real economic issues, whether political, theoretical or policy-oriented.