An almost-optimally fair three-party coin-flipping protocol

Iftach Haitner, Eliad Tsfadia
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引用次数: 29

Abstract

In a multiparty fair coin-flipping protocol, the parties output a common (close to) unbiased bit, even when some corrupted parties try to bias the output. Cleve [STOC 1986] has shown that in the case of dishonest majority (i.e., at least half of the parties can be corrupted), in any m-round coin-flipping protocol, the corrupted parties can bias the honest parties' common output bit by Ω(1/m). For more than two decades, the best known coin-flipping protocols against dishonest majority had bias [EQUATION], where ℓ is the number of corrupted parties. This was changed by a recent breakthrough result of Moran et al. [TCC 2009], who constructed an m-round, two-party coin-flipping protocol with optimal bias Θ(1/m). In a subsequent work, Beimel et al. [Crypto 2010] extended this result to the multiparty case in which less than 2/3 of the parties can be corrupted. Still for the case of 2/3 (or more) corrupted parties, the best known protocol had bias [EQUATION]. In particular, this was the state of affairs for the natural three-party case. We make a step towards eliminating the above gap, presenting an m-round, three-party coin-flipping protocol, with bias O(log2m)/m. Our approach (which we also apply for the two-party case) does not follow the "threshold round" paradigm used in the work of Moran et al. and Beimel et al., but rather is a variation of the majority protocol of Cleve, used to obtain the aforementioned [EQUATION]-bias protocol.
一个近乎最优公平的三方抛硬币协议
在多方公平抛币协议中,各方输出一个共同的(接近)无偏位,即使一些腐败的各方试图偏置输出。Cleve [STOC 1986]表明,在不诚实的多数情况下(即至少有一半的参与方可能被腐败),在任何m轮抛币协议中,腐败参与方可以使诚实参与方的共同输出位偏差Ω(1/m)。二十多年来,最著名的针对不诚实多数的抛硬币协议存在偏见[等式],其中,r是腐败方的数量。Moran等人[TCC 2009]最近的突破性成果改变了这一点,他们构建了一个具有最佳偏差Θ(1/m)的m轮,两方抛硬币协议。在随后的工作中,Beimel等人[Crypto 2010]将这一结果扩展到少于2/3的各方可能被破坏的多方情况。对于2/3(或更多)腐败方的情况,最著名的协议存在偏差[等式]。特别是,这是自然的三方案件的情况。我们朝着消除上述差距迈出了一步,提出了一个m轮三方抛硬币协议,偏差为O(log2m)/m。我们的方法(我们也适用于两方情况)不遵循Moran等人和Beimel等人的工作中使用的“阈值轮”范式,而是Cleve的多数协议的变体,用于获得上述[EQUATION]-bias协议。
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