BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Abstract

To rate this publication click here. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the for insightful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors or misinterpretations which remain are entirely my own. All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army. mil/newsletter/. FOREWORD Guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest, and … no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale. Bernard Fall Contrary to the wave of euphoria following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world order did not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare. In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation against imperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadist wars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embraced revolutionary warfare, although not Mao's People's War model. In view of this assumption, a study of revolutionary warfare is apt because the conflict between the West and radical jihadism will continue to take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failed states. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines the extent to which some states create the conditions for revolutionary movements to flourish. Employing Jeff Goodwin's analytical framework for exploring the political context behind revolutionary movements, Lieutenant Colonel Millen explores how the governments in Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nic-aragua (1967-79) unintentionally empowered revolutionary movements, resulting in these governments' demise. He supplements Goodwin's framework by including an examination of the insurgent leadership's political-military acumen. Lieutenant Colonel Millen extrapolates the political-military lessons from these conflicts to suggest that the iv United States should minimize the level and type of assistance to states fighting in an insurgency because these states possess greater advantages than previously supposed. The reader will find his analysis compelling. Often, examining failure provides …