The Role of Blockholders in the Corporate Debt Maturity Structure

Zheyao Pan, Kelvin Jui Keng Tan
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of blockholders on the corporate debt maturity structure within the framework of agency theory. Using a novel and hand-collected dataset in Australia, we find support for our hypothesis that debt maturity is a concave function of block equity ownership. Our findings contribute to empirical evidence on the monitoring effects of blockholders and the use of debt maturity to control for debt-equity and manager-equity conflicts.
大股东在公司债务期限结构中的作用
本文在代理理论的框架下考察了大股东对公司债务期限结构的影响。在澳大利亚使用一个新颖的手工收集的数据集,我们发现支持我们的假设,即债务期限是块股权所有权的凹函数。我们的研究结果为大股东的监测效果以及使用债务期限来控制债务-股权和管理者-股权冲突提供了经验证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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