A multi-leader stackelberg game for two-hop systems with wireless energy transfer

Shiyang Leng, A. Yener
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

We study a two-hop network with wireless energy transfer (WET) from the source to multiple energy harvesting relays. Both the source and relays intend to transmit dedicated information to the destination. The source, without direct reliable channels to the destination, needs the relays to forward signals, while the relays are short of energy and have to harvest energy from the source to transmit their own data and relaying the source's data. Relays use time division to harvest then transmit. For the multiple access channel (MAC) from the relays to the destination, we consider both time division multiple access (TDMA) between the relays and simultaneous transmission (ST) by all relays. The source and the relays are all selfish and aim to maximize their own utility. We take a game theoretic viewpoint to model the hierarchical competition between the source and the relays. In particular, multi-leader Stackelberg games are formulated where the relays play as the leaders and the source plays as the follower. The existence and the uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) are analyzed, based on which algorithms are proposed to achieve the SE. The numerical results verify that the proposed algorithms improve the system performance comparing to the baseline scheme.
具有无线能量传输的两跳系统的多领导stackelberg博弈
研究了一种具有从源到多个能量收集中继的无线能量传输(WET)的两跳网络。源和中继都打算将专用信息传输到目的地。信号源没有直接可靠的通道到达目的地,需要中继器来转发信号,而中继器能量不足,必须从信号源获取能量来传输自己的数据并中继信号源的数据。中继使用分时采集然后发送。对于从中继到目的地的多址通道(MAC),我们考虑了中继之间的时分多址(TDMA)和所有中继的同步传输(ST)。电源和继电器都是自私的,目的是使自己的效用最大化。我们采用博弈论的观点来模拟源和中继之间的等级竞争。特别是,在多领导者Stackelberg游戏中,传递者扮演领导者,源者扮演追随者。分析了Stackelberg均衡的存在性和唯一性,在此基础上提出了实现Stackelberg均衡的算法。数值结果表明,与基准方案相比,所提算法提高了系统性能。
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