{"title":"How Conspiracy Theories Spread","authors":"Darin DeWitt, Matthew D. Atkinson, D. Wegner","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Why do some ideas of uncertain merit, like conspiracy theories, gain traction and spread through society? To date, conspiracy theory scholarship primarily focuses on thick description, generates case-specific hypotheses, and answers this question on an ad hoc basis. To take the next step in terms of scientific progress, the conspiracy theory literature must develop explanations that generalize across cases. To the extent that scholars have offered a more general explanation, they point to a formal theory called herd behavior, which was designed to explain why people believe ideas in the absence of much evidence. The herd behavior model has been advanced as a matter of convenience rather than as a result of critical assessment about the mechanisms in play. But it’s not the only mechanism by which a dubious ideas might spread and, furthermore, it fails to fit the facts of many cases where conspiracy theories gain traction. We consider how three other major political science explanations of opinion formation can be applied to conspiracy theories and provide a foundation for conspiracy theory researchers interested in moving from the scholarly conversation from description to explanation.","PeriodicalId":341612,"journal":{"name":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"16","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190844073.003.0021","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Abstract
Why do some ideas of uncertain merit, like conspiracy theories, gain traction and spread through society? To date, conspiracy theory scholarship primarily focuses on thick description, generates case-specific hypotheses, and answers this question on an ad hoc basis. To take the next step in terms of scientific progress, the conspiracy theory literature must develop explanations that generalize across cases. To the extent that scholars have offered a more general explanation, they point to a formal theory called herd behavior, which was designed to explain why people believe ideas in the absence of much evidence. The herd behavior model has been advanced as a matter of convenience rather than as a result of critical assessment about the mechanisms in play. But it’s not the only mechanism by which a dubious ideas might spread and, furthermore, it fails to fit the facts of many cases where conspiracy theories gain traction. We consider how three other major political science explanations of opinion formation can be applied to conspiracy theories and provide a foundation for conspiracy theory researchers interested in moving from the scholarly conversation from description to explanation.