Do Health Insurers Manage Their Medical Loss Ratios? At What Cost?

Elizabeth Plummer, William F. Wempe
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We use plan-level data to examine a reporting incentive unique to health insurers—the federal Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) provisions—which require that health plans spend a specified percentage of premiums on claims or else pay policyholder rebates. While there are no penalties for noncompliance with the MLR provisions, incentives for insurers to comply include avoiding political and reputation costs, reducing administrative burdens, and eliminating rebate payments. We find that health plans with pre-managed MLRs— i.e., the MLRs that would be reported without reporting discretion—below the required MLR overstate claims, thereby increasing their MLRs and reducing or eliminating rebate payments. Overall, results suggest that overstating claims reduced rebate payments by approximately $190 million to $325 million for 20112013; i.e., about 10–17% of total rebates actually paid. We also find that plans with pre-managed MLRs significantly greater than the minimum required MLR understate claims, thereby improving plan earnings while still complying with the MLR provisions. These understatements average between 14–34% of plans’ pre-tax earnings.
健康保险公司管理他们的医疗损失率吗?代价是什么?
我们使用计划级别的数据来检验健康保险公司特有的报告激励机制——联邦平价医疗法案(ACA)的医疗损失率(MLR)条款——该条款要求健康保险公司将一定比例的保费用于索赔,否则就向投保人支付回扣。虽然不遵守MLR规定不会受到惩罚,但保险公司遵守的激励措施包括避免政治和声誉成本,减少行政负担,以及取消回扣支付。我们发现,预先管理MLR的健康计划——即,在没有报告自由裁量权的情况下报告的MLR——低于要求的MLR夸大了索赔,从而增加了MLR,减少或消除了回扣支付。总体而言,结果表明,2011 - 2013年,夸大索赔减少了约1.9亿至3.25亿美元的返利支付;即,实际支付的回扣总额约为10-17%。我们还发现,预先管理MLR的计划明显高于最低要求的MLR,从而在遵守MLR规定的同时提高了计划收益。这些被低估的金额平均在计划税前收益的14-34%之间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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