A Proportionality Theory of IO Emergency Powers

Abstract

Chapter 3 develops a proportionality theory of IO emergency powers to account for the variable outcomes of normalization (ratchets) and containment (rollbacks). It posits that IO exceptionalism creates distributional consequences at the level of political autonomy that are positive for the governors and negative for the governed. Since IO authority is dependent on its general recognition by the rule-addressees, the states and supranational actors in authority need to be able to justify their measures as proportionate, or else the delegitimation attempts by their opponents threaten to undermine the authority. Ratchets and rollbacks are thus conceived as the product of rhetorical legitimation struggles among the holders and the addressees of IO emergency powers that revolve around the normative standard of proportionality. The chapter derives a set of testable hypotheses from the proportionality model and provides alternative explanations based on variations of rational institutionalism that focus on state power and institutional design.