Strategic Interactions between Liquefied Natural Gas and Domestic Gas Markets: A Bilevel Model

Abstract

This paper presents a bilevel programming model to aid decision-making for two players who interact strategically in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply chain, possibly with conflicting interests. In the proposed model, an LNG operator is the leader and a natural gas (NG) producer is the follower. The LNG operator attempts to optimally locate LNG export terminals, purchase gas from the NG producer, and export it as LNG. The NG producer aims to optimize production, pipeline investments, and sales to domestic consumers and the LNG operator. To solve the bilevel problem, we first reformulate it as a single-level problem by exploiting the convexity of the lower-level problem. Then, we use disjunctive reformulations of complementarity constraints and piecewise linear approximations of objective function terms to convert the problem into a convex quadratic mixed-integer program (QMIP). Computational experiments confirm that the QMIP is tractable and can be solved efficiently. We apply our bilevel framework to a case study of the Gulf-Southwest region of the United States and evaluate several decision-making scenarios. The scenario results emphasize the importance of using the bilevel methodology to anticipate the effects of new LNG export facilities on NG prices across the domestic gas network. Adding these large gas-consuming facilities at specific locations puts upward pressure on domestic gas prices, although this is somewhat mitigated by the NG producer's optimal production response to the increased demand.