The Coming Shift in Shareholder Activism: From "Firm-Specific" to "Systematic Risk" Proxy Campaigns (and How to Enable Them)

J. Coffee
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Abstract

This article distinguishes two types of shareholder activism: (1) firm-specific activism, which has a long history and focuses on changes at a specific target company, and (2) systematic risk activism, which seeks to reduce the systematic risk in a portfolio and thereby benefit diversified investors. Typically, such a systematic risk campaign may force a portfolio company to internalize negative externalities to benefit the other companies in the portfolio (such as by reducing carbon emissions or undertaking climate risk reforms). But, systematic risk activism faces an inherent difficulty: the party that leads this campaign and invests in the target company may incur a significant loss when the target company’s stock price falls. This will be particularly difficult for activist hedge funds to accept, because they have small portfolios and cannot recoup their losses on the target firm by gains at the other portfolio companies. Properly understood, the recent campaign by Engine No. 1 with respect to ExxonMobil exemplifies these problems and suggests that activist hedge funds make ill-suited leaders for this form of activism. If so, there may be a strong demand for systematic risk activism among diversified investors, but potential campaigns could remain headless, as diversified investors will themselves be reluctant to lead such a campaign. This article surveys possible answers to this problem (some of which are suggested by the Engine No. 1 campaign). Nonetheless, this problem surrounding the incentives of hedge funds is aggravated by the traditionally independent stance of diversified investors, who are reluctant to join groups or expend funds, and by the inability of potential campaign leaders to charge adequately for their services. This article suggests several means of which to enable such campaigns.
即将到来的股东行动主义转变:从“公司特定”到“系统风险”代理运动(以及如何使其成为可能)
本文区分了两种类型的股东行动主义:(1)公司特定行动主义,具有悠久的历史,专注于特定目标公司的变化;(2)系统风险行动主义,旨在降低投资组合中的系统风险,从而使多元化的投资者受益。通常,这样的系统性风险活动可能会迫使投资组合公司内部化负外部性,以使投资组合中的其他公司受益(例如通过减少碳排放或进行气候风险改革)。但是,系统性风险行动主义面临着一个固有的困难:当目标公司股价下跌时,领导这一行动并投资于目标公司的一方可能会遭受重大损失。这对激进的对冲基金来说尤其难以接受,因为它们的投资组合规模较小,无法通过投资组合中其他公司的收益来弥补目标公司的损失。正确地理解,引擎一号最近针对埃克森美孚的运动就是这些问题的例证,并表明激进对冲基金不适合作为这种形式的激进主义的领导者。如果是这样,多元化投资者可能对系统性风险行动主义有强烈的需求,但潜在的运动可能仍然是无头的,因为多元化投资者自己将不愿领导这样的运动。本文调查了这个问题的可能答案(其中一些是由引擎1运动提出的)。然而,多元化投资者传统上的独立立场(他们不愿加入团体或花费资金),以及潜在的竞选领袖无法对他们的服务收取足够的费用,加剧了围绕对冲基金激励机制的问题。本文提出了几种启用此类活动的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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