V. Agarwal, B. Barber, S. Cheng, A. Hameed, A. Yasuda
{"title":"Private Company Valuations by Mutual Funds","authors":"V. Agarwal, B. Barber, S. Cheng, A. Hameed, A. Yasuda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3066449","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Mutual fund families set and report values of their private startup holdings, which affect the fund net asset value (NAV) at which investors buy/sell fund shares. We test three hypotheses related to the valuation practice: (i) information cost/access, (ii) litigation risk, and (iii) strategic NAV management. Consistent with (i), families with larger PE holdings and/or stronger information access update valuations more frequently in the absence of public information releases, their updates co-move less with other families, and their fund returns jump less at follow-on financings. We find no support for hypotheses (ii) or (iii). We also find that high-PE-exposure funds are subject to greater financial fragility.","PeriodicalId":101497,"journal":{"name":"Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2018 Conference (Archive)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2018 Conference (Archive)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3066449","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Abstract
Mutual fund families set and report values of their private startup holdings, which affect the fund net asset value (NAV) at which investors buy/sell fund shares. We test three hypotheses related to the valuation practice: (i) information cost/access, (ii) litigation risk, and (iii) strategic NAV management. Consistent with (i), families with larger PE holdings and/or stronger information access update valuations more frequently in the absence of public information releases, their updates co-move less with other families, and their fund returns jump less at follow-on financings. We find no support for hypotheses (ii) or (iii). We also find that high-PE-exposure funds are subject to greater financial fragility.