Private Company Valuations by Mutual Funds

V. Agarwal, B. Barber, S. Cheng, A. Hameed, A. Yasuda
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引用次数: 17

Abstract

Mutual fund families set and report values of their private startup holdings, which affect the fund net asset value (NAV) at which investors buy/sell fund shares. We test three hypotheses related to the valuation practice: (i) information cost/access, (ii) litigation risk, and (iii) strategic NAV management. Consistent with (i), families with larger PE holdings and/or stronger information access update valuations more frequently in the absence of public information releases, their updates co-move less with other families, and their fund returns jump less at follow-on financings. We find no support for hypotheses (ii) or (iii). We also find that high-PE-exposure funds are subject to greater financial fragility.
共同基金对私人公司的估值
共同基金家族设定并报告其私人初创公司股份的价值,这影响投资者买卖基金股份的基金净资产值(NAV)。我们测试了与估值实践相关的三个假设:(i)信息成本/获取,(ii)诉讼风险,(iii)战略资产净值管理。与(i)一致,在没有公开信息发布的情况下,拥有更大私募股权和/或更强信息获取渠道的家族更频繁地更新估值,他们的更新与其他家族的同步变化更小,他们的基金回报在后续融资中跳得更小。我们没有发现对假设(ii)或(iii)的支持。我们还发现,高pe敞口基金更容易受到金融脆弱性的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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