A Residential Client-side Perspective on SSL Certificates

Abstract

SSL certificates are a core component of the public key infrastructure that underpins encrypted communication in the Internet. In this paper, we report the results of a longitudinal study of the characteristics of SSL certificate chains presented to clients during secure web (HTTPS) connection setup. Our data set consists of 23B SSL certificate chains collected from a global panel consisting of over 2M residential client machines over a period of 6 months. The data informing our analyses provide perspective on the entire chain of trust, including root certificates, across a wide distribution of client machines. We identify over 35M unique certificate chains with diverse relationships at all levels of the PKI hierarchy. We report on the characteristics of valid certificates, which make up 99.7% of the total corpus. We also examine invalid certificate chains, finding that 93% of them contain an untrusted root certificate and we find they have shorter average chain length than their valid counterparts. Finally, we examine two unintended but prevalent behaviors in our data: the deprecation of root certificates and secure traffic interception. Our results support aspects of prior, scan-based studies on certificate characteristics but contradict other findings, highlighting the importance of the residential client-side perspective.