Power and the Evolution of Inequity

Cailin O’Connor
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Abstract

The chapter starts with an introduction of the primary paradigm used in this half of the book—the bargaining game. It uses this model to show why in groups with social categories fairness in bargaining is not the expected outcome of cultural evolution. Instead, social categories act as a symmetry breaker that stabilizes inequitable bargaining conventions. The chapter then turns to the role power plays in the evolution of bargaining. Powerful groups often gain an advantage with respect to the emergence of conventions of resource division. This can lead to compounding processes that profoundly disadvantage some social groups. These models make especially clear how irrelevant markers like race and gender can come to be more important in determining resource division than relevant factors, such as individual status.
权力与不平等的演变
这一章首先介绍了本书这半部分使用的主要范式——讨价还价游戏。它使用这个模型来说明为什么在具有社会类别的群体中,讨价还价中的公平不是文化进化的预期结果。相反,社会类别充当了一个对称破坏者,稳定了不公平的讨价还价惯例。然后,本章转向权力在议价演变中所扮演的角色。在资源分配惯例的出现方面,强大的集团往往获得优势。这可能导致复杂的过程,对某些社会群体造成严重的不利影响。这些模型特别清楚地表明,在决定资源分配时,种族和性别等不相关的标记如何比个人地位等相关因素更重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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