Network vs market relations: The effect of friends in crowdfunding

Abstract

Crowds offer a new form of efficacious collective decision making, yet knowledge about the mechanisms by which they achieve superior outcomes remains nascent. It has been suggested that crowds work best with market-like relationships when individuals make independent decisions and possess dissimilar information. By contrast, sociological discussions of markets argue that risky decisions are mitigated by network relations that embed economic transactions in social ties that promote trustworthiness and reciprocity. To investigate the role of networks within crowds and their performance effects, we examined the complete record of financial lending decisions on Prosper.com, 1/2006-3/2012, the first U.S. crowdfunding platform and a chief gateway to capital for entrepreneurs and general borrowers that continues to disrupt conventional financial lending structures infusing more than $5.1 billion into the market in 2013. Our study reveals how reciprocity, recurring borrower-lender dyads, and persistent co-lending underpin the dynamics of network lending. Further, we show how network ties influence the evolution of the lending behavior. We find that in the early stage of fundraising, network relations provide larger proportions of loans, typically lending four times more per bid than strangers. They also respond to loan requests on average 59.5% sooner than strangers. The size of the first loan and the time to lending also tend to prompt lending by strangers, suggesting that network relations might move the market, a finding that persists even as fewer lenders dominate more of the market for loans on Prosper. Finally, network relations are associated with greater engagement: when the first loan is underwritten by a friend, 50% of the remaining loans come from friends as well.