Assessing Risk on Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities: Did Credit Rating Agencies Misrepresent Risk to Investors?

Harold C. Barnett
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has asked whether credit rating agencies (CRA) committed fraud by misleading investors with respect to the default risk on mortgage backed securities (MBS). This paper argues that, to the detriment of investors, the CRA did not incorporate information available to securitizers in their ratings of subprime mortgage backed securities. A test of this proposition utilizes data on CRA ratings of 32 Goldman Sachs MBS issued in 2005-2007 and Moody’s Investor Services projections of loss for these mortgage pools. The percent of principal balances rated triple-A is relatively constant over this period. In contrast, projected losses increase substantially for 2006-2007 MBS issues. A Goldman Sachs presentation to its Board highlights factors that enhanced the risk of default in 2006-2007. Review of a select sample of 2006-2007 MBS prospectuses contain disclosures of market, originator and mortgage characteristics that the securitizer associates with an increased risk of default. These disclosures suggest that the risk of default increased step wise beginning in 2006. While the same information was available to the CRA, their credit risk ratings did not incorporate this information and remained flat. Should the SEC obtain data on the near term performance of these MBS they would be able to establish if this divergence in risk assessment was substantial and if the CRA chose to support their clients to the detriment of MBS investors.
评估次级抵押贷款支持证券的风险:信用评级机构是否向投资者歪曲了风险?
美国证券交易委员会(SEC)就信用评级机构(CRA)是否在抵押贷款支持证券(MBS)的违约风险方面误导投资者进行了调查。本文认为,在对次级抵押贷款支持证券的评级中,CRA没有纳入证券化机构可获得的信息,这对投资者不利。对这一命题的检验使用了2005-2007年发行的32个高盛MBS的CRA评级数据和穆迪投资者服务公司对这些抵押贷款池损失的预测。在此期间,被评为aaa级的本金余额所占比例相对稳定。相比之下,2006-2007年MBS的预计损失将大幅增加。高盛在其董事会的一份报告中强调了2006-2007年间增加违约风险的因素。回顾2006-2007年MBS招股说明书的精选样本,其中包含市场、发起人和抵押贷款特征的披露,证券化机构将其与违约风险增加联系起来。这些披露表明,违约风险从2006年开始逐步增加。虽然CRA可以获得相同的信息,但他们的信用风险评级没有纳入这些信息,保持不变。如果SEC获得这些MBS近期表现的数据,他们将能够确定风险评估的差异是否很大,以及CRA是否选择支持其客户而损害MBS投资者的利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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