When Polarization Trumps Civic Virtue: Partisan Conflict and the Subversion of Democracy by Incumbents

Milan W. Svolik
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引用次数: 136

Abstract

We propose an explanation for the most prevalent form of democratic breakdown after the Cold War: the subversion of democracy by incumbents. In both democratization research and democracy promotion practice, the public is assumed to serve as a check on incumbents' temptations to subvert democracy. We explain why this check fails in polarized societies. When polarization is high, voters have a strong preference for their favorite candidate, which makes it costly for them to punish an incumbent by voting for a challenger. Incumbents exploit this lack of credible punishment by manipulating the democratic process in their favor. Our analysis of an original survey experiment conducted in Venezuela demonstrates that voters in polarized societies are indeed willing to trade off democratic principles for partisan interests and that their willingness to do so increases in the intensity of their partisanship. These findings suggest the need to re-evaluate conventional measures of support for democracy and provide an answer to a fundamental question about its survival: When can we expect the public to serve as a check on the authoritarian temptations of elected politicians?
当两极分化胜过公民美德:党派冲突和现任者对民主的颠覆
我们对冷战后最普遍的民主崩溃形式提出了一个解释:现任者对民主的颠覆。无论是在民主化研究还是民主推进实践中,民众都被认为是现任者颠覆民主主义诱惑的制约者。我们解释了为什么这种检查在两极分化的社会中失败了。当两极分化严重时,选民对他们喜欢的候选人有强烈的偏好,这使得他们通过投票给挑战者来惩罚现任者的成本很高。在位者利用这种缺乏可信惩罚的情况,操纵民主程序,使之对自己有利。我们对在委内瑞拉进行的一项原始调查实验的分析表明,在两极分化的社会中,选民确实愿意为了党派利益而牺牲民主原则,而且他们这样做的意愿随着党派关系的加剧而增加。这些发现表明,有必要重新评估支持民主的传统衡量标准,并为一个关乎民主存亡的根本问题提供答案:我们什么时候才能指望公众对民选政客的威权诱惑起到制衡作用?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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