Corruption and Organized Crime in the Russian Transition

Abstract

Much of the perceived increase in corruption and organized crime in transitional Russi a represents a more open version of activity that was commonplace during the pre-refor m era . The partial nature of reforms, reflected in excessive government intervention in th e economy and poor public provision of protection and contract law, has been a major source of new economic crime . Simultaneously . the costs of corruption and organize d crime have gone up, largely due to their relative disorganization and the genera l economic uncertainty during the reforms . The benefits of economic crime in transitiona l Russia likewise are higher than they would be in advanced Western market economies . because the alternatives are less attractive . Increased enforcement of the law should b e combined with further liberalization and the development of publicly-provided contrac t law to reduce the amount of economic crime . The social costs of the remaining crime can be reduced via stabilization, political steadiness . and increases in accountability arising from a free press, an independent judiciary, and a watchdog legislature .