Making a Case for Regulating Institutional Shareholders' Corporate Governance Roles

I. Chiu, D. Katelouzou
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Drawing on the disconnect that currently exists between the social expectations associated with the corporate governance role of institutions and the institutions’ private interests, this article suggests that the current English legal framework does not adequately promote an optimal corporate governance role for institutions and does not meet the public interest of safeguarding investors’ long-term saving needs and sustaining a sound wealth-creating corporate sector in the long term. Our starting point is that investor-led governance, as this is aspired by UK policy-makers, is not only a matter of achieving beneficiaries’ private investment objectives through maximising long-term shareholder-value, but a matter of public interest. Next, we argue that existing regimes of private law that govern this area – first, the fabric of largely private law in contract and trust that governs the investment funds’ relationships with their beneficiaries, and, secondly, the company law and corporate governance norms that govern investment funds’ shareholder role – do not adequately take into account the public interest and, increasingly, are unable to meet the needs of private interests too. These inadequacies have only led to reinforcing a governance deficit for institutional shareholder behaviour and have left the dubious quality of institutions’ behaviour to market forces. We suggest that institutions’ shareholder behaviour should be governed in securities and investment management regulation and we outline the broad contours of how this may be achieved.
规制机构股东的公司治理角色
鉴于目前与机构公司治理角色相关的社会期望与机构的私人利益之间存在脱节,本文认为,当前的英国法律框架没有充分促进机构的最佳公司治理角色,也没有满足保护投资者长期储蓄需求和长期维持稳健的创造财富的公司部门的公共利益。我们的出发点是,正如英国政策制定者所渴望的那样,投资者主导的治理不仅是通过最大化长期股东价值来实现受益者私人投资目标的问题,也是一个关乎公共利益的问题。接下来,我们认为,管理这一领域的现有私法制度——首先,主要是管理投资基金与其受益人关系的合同和信托私法结构,其次,管理投资基金股东角色的公司法和公司治理规范——没有充分考虑到公共利益,而且越来越无法满足私人利益的需求。这些不足只会加剧机构股东行为的治理赤字,并将机构行为的可疑质量留给市场力量。我们建议应在证券和投资管理监管中约束机构的股东行为,并概述了如何实现这一目标的大致轮廓。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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