Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

R. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite
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引用次数: 32

Abstract

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We further show that truthful revelation is an approximate ex post equilibrium. Lastly, we show that in replicated settings aggregate payments sufficient to induce truthful revelation go to zero.
相互依赖估值的实施
众所周知,维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯(VCG)机制对私人价值选择问题实施有效结果的能力并不适用于相互依赖的价值问题。当一个代理人的类型影响到其他代理人的效用时,当面对VCG支付时,他可能不愿意如实透露自己的类型。我们表明,当代理人信息较小时,对VCG转移存在微小的修改,以恢复激励兼容性。我们进一步表明,真实的启示是一个近似的事后平衡。最后,我们证明了在重复设置中,足以诱导真实披露的总支付趋于零。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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