{"title":"An Architecture for Component Authentication using Secure Cyber-physical Information and Blockchain","authors":"M. Sandborn, Carlos Olea, Sam Hays, Jules White","doi":"10.1109/FMEC54266.2021.9732547","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) tie software to components that manipulate physical space, and safety-critical CPSs comprise an increasing share of roles in process automation, transportation, and industrial operations. As device intercon-nectivity increases, security paradigms must be developed to address cross-domain interactions and prevent vulnerabilities from one domain (e.g. misconfigured robot controller software) manifesting in the other (e.g. mechatronic arm harms factory worker). In particular, counterfeit goods pose a significant threat to the construction of safety-critical CPSs with downstream effects spanning both cyber and physical environments (e.g. commercial aircraft with faulty fuel pump). In this paper, we present a theoretical architecture for exchanging and verifying Signed Physically Unclonable iDentities (SPUDs). The proposed system, based on Blockchain, allows tracking of components throughout a CPS supply network using both cyber and physical identifiers.","PeriodicalId":217996,"journal":{"name":"2021 Sixth International Conference on Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2021 Sixth International Conference on Fog and Mobile Edge Computing (FMEC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FMEC54266.2021.9732547","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) tie software to components that manipulate physical space, and safety-critical CPSs comprise an increasing share of roles in process automation, transportation, and industrial operations. As device intercon-nectivity increases, security paradigms must be developed to address cross-domain interactions and prevent vulnerabilities from one domain (e.g. misconfigured robot controller software) manifesting in the other (e.g. mechatronic arm harms factory worker). In particular, counterfeit goods pose a significant threat to the construction of safety-critical CPSs with downstream effects spanning both cyber and physical environments (e.g. commercial aircraft with faulty fuel pump). In this paper, we present a theoretical architecture for exchanging and verifying Signed Physically Unclonable iDentities (SPUDs). The proposed system, based on Blockchain, allows tracking of components throughout a CPS supply network using both cyber and physical identifiers.