Applying Insider Trading Law to Congressmen, Government Officials, and the Political Intelligence Industry

J. Verret
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This chapter, from Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., Edward Elgar 2013), considers the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, or STOCK Act, passed by Congress by overwhelming margins in 2012 and signed by the President. The STOCK Act’s goal was to apply insider trading prohibitions contained in the Securities Exchange Act to members of Congress, their staffs, and the executive and judicial branches. This chapter will sketch the boundaries of application for the new STOCK Act, both with respect to government employees and to outside traders on political intelligence, and will explore some of the uncertainties all of these parties face in the wake of the STOCK Act. Two questions are considered. First, what unforeseen doctrinal challenges will be presented by the STOCK Act’s application of insider trading principles to members of Congress and government employees? Secondly, does the STOCK Act indirectly extend insider trading liability to outsiders trading on the basis of information that is obtained from members of Congress or government employees, and if not should the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) extend application to them? This chapter points to some serious doctrinal inconsistencies in the STOCK ACT’s application of insider trading doctrine under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to government employees.
内幕交易法适用于国会议员、政府官员和政治情报行业
本章来自《内幕交易研究手册》(Stephen M. Bainbridge编,Edward Elgar 2013),考虑了2012年国会以压倒性优势通过并由总统签署的《国会知识停止交易法案》或《股票法案》。《证券法》的目标是将《证券交易法》中的内幕交易禁令适用于国会议员、他们的工作人员以及行政和司法部门。本章将概述新《股票法》的适用范围,既包括政府雇员,也包括政治情报方面的外部交易员,并将探讨所有这些各方在《股票法》实施后面临的一些不确定性。这里考虑了两个问题。首先,《证券法》将内幕交易原则适用于国会议员和政府雇员,会带来哪些不可预见的理论挑战?第二,《证券法》是否间接地将内幕交易责任扩大到根据国会议员或政府雇员获得的信息进行交易的局外人,如果不是,证券交易委员会(SEC)是否应将适用范围扩大到他们?本章指出了《证券法》在1934年《证券交易法》下对政府雇员适用内幕交易原则的一些严重的理论不一致之处。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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