Secrets Revealed in Container Images: An Internet-wide Study on Occurrence and Impact

M. Dahlmanns, Constantin Sander, Robin Decker, Klaus Wehrle
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Containerization allows bundling applications and their dependencies into a single image. The containerization framework Docker eases the use of this concept and enables sharing images publicly, gaining high momentum. However, it can lead to users creating and sharing images that include private keys or API secrets—either by mistake or out of negligence. This leakage impairs the creator’s security and that of everyone using the image. Yet, the extent of this practice and how to counteract it remains unclear. In this paper, we analyze 337,171 images from Docker Hub and 8,076 other private registries unveiling that 8.5% of images indeed include secrets. Specifically, we find 52,107 private keys and 3,158 leaked API secrets, both opening a large attack surface, i.e., putting authentication and confidentiality of privacy-sensitive data at stake and even allow active attacks. We further document that those leaked keys are used in the wild: While we discovered 1,060 certificates relying on compromised keys being issued by public certificate authorities, based on further active Internet measurements, we find 275,269 TLS and SSH hosts using leaked private keys for authentication. To counteract this issue, we discuss how our methodology can be used to prevent secret leakage and reuse.
容器图像揭示的秘密:互联网范围内的发生和影响研究
容器化允许将应用程序及其依赖关系捆绑到单个映像中。容器化框架Docker简化了这一概念的使用,并支持公开共享映像,获得了很高的动力。但是,它可能导致用户创建和共享包含私钥或API秘密的映像——无论是由于错误还是由于疏忽。这种泄漏会损害创建者和使用该图像的每个人的安全性。然而,这种做法的程度以及如何抵制它仍不清楚。在本文中,我们分析了来自Docker Hub和8,076个其他私有注册中心的337,171张图像,揭示了8.5%的图像确实包含秘密。具体来说,我们发现了52,107个私钥和3,158个泄露的API秘密,这两个都打开了一个巨大的攻击面,即将隐私敏感数据的身份验证和机密性置于危险之中,甚至允许主动攻击。我们进一步记录了这些泄露的密钥在外部使用:虽然我们发现1,060个证书依赖于由公共证书颁发机构颁发的受损密钥,但基于进一步的主动Internet测量,我们发现275,269个TLS和SSH主机使用泄露的私钥进行身份验证。为了解决这个问题,我们将讨论如何使用我们的方法来防止秘密泄漏和重用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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