Territorial Cleavages and Constitutional Transitions

Abstract

This chapter explores how patterns of territorial political mobilization influence the processes of Constitution-making and the choices of constitutional design, focusing on seventeen countries that differ significantly in the structure of their politically salient territorial cleavages. The seventeen cases present relatively recent examples of constitutional transitions. The chapter first examines what it calls “constitutional moments” and three contextual variables that shape their structure and dynamics: the political geometry of territorial cleavages, the means to pursue claims for territorial accommodation, and the relative power positions of political actors. The chapter then considers the context and dynamics of constitutional moments, three stages of Constitution-making processes (agenda setting, deliberation, ratification), and three major constitutional design options to respond to claims for territorial accommodation (symmetrical federalism or devolution with a majoritarian central government, highly devolved federalism with a consociational central government, special autonomy for small territories, and a majoritarian central government).