{"title":"South Asia in the Great Divergence Debate","authors":"K. Yazdani","doi":"10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190277727.013.354","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since the seminal publication of Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence (2000), there has been a continuing upsurge of writings on the possible reasons behind the rise of the West from a “global perspective.” Most of these studies focus on comparisons between Western Europe and China. Yet, in recent years works on India and the great divergence have followed suit, taking up research questions that have not been as prominent since the proliferation of debates on the subcontinent’s pre-colonial potentialities for capitalist development in the 1960s and 1970s. As of now, the paucity of quantitative data complicates endeavors to compare pre-colonial India with Europe and explore the underlying reasons behind the great divergence. Case studies examining the socio-economic history of a number of South Asian regions are still needed in order to conduct systematic comparisons between both advanced and underdeveloped regions of the subcontinent and those of Europe. The existing evidence, however, suggests that some of the \"core areas\" of 16th- to 18th-century India had more or less comparable levels of agricultural productivity, transport facilities (during the dry season), military capabilities in terms of ground forces (e.g., Mysore and the Marathas), commercial and manufacturing capacities (especially in textile, ship, and metal production), and social mobility of merchants (e.g., in Gujarat). Moreover, Indian rulers and artisans did not shy away from adopting European know-how (e.g., in weapon and ship production) when it redounded to their advantage. On the other hand, South Asia possessed some geo-climatic disadvantages vis-à-vis Western Europe that also impeded investments in infrastructure. India seems to have had a lower degree of consumer demand and lagged behind Western Europe in a number of fields such as mechanical engineering, the level of productive forces, higher education, circulation of useful knowledge, institutional efficiency, upper-class property rights, the nascent bourgeois class consciousness, and inter-communal and proto-national identity formations.","PeriodicalId":270501,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ACREFORE/9780190277727.013.354","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Since the seminal publication of Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence (2000), there has been a continuing upsurge of writings on the possible reasons behind the rise of the West from a “global perspective.” Most of these studies focus on comparisons between Western Europe and China. Yet, in recent years works on India and the great divergence have followed suit, taking up research questions that have not been as prominent since the proliferation of debates on the subcontinent’s pre-colonial potentialities for capitalist development in the 1960s and 1970s. As of now, the paucity of quantitative data complicates endeavors to compare pre-colonial India with Europe and explore the underlying reasons behind the great divergence. Case studies examining the socio-economic history of a number of South Asian regions are still needed in order to conduct systematic comparisons between both advanced and underdeveloped regions of the subcontinent and those of Europe. The existing evidence, however, suggests that some of the "core areas" of 16th- to 18th-century India had more or less comparable levels of agricultural productivity, transport facilities (during the dry season), military capabilities in terms of ground forces (e.g., Mysore and the Marathas), commercial and manufacturing capacities (especially in textile, ship, and metal production), and social mobility of merchants (e.g., in Gujarat). Moreover, Indian rulers and artisans did not shy away from adopting European know-how (e.g., in weapon and ship production) when it redounded to their advantage. On the other hand, South Asia possessed some geo-climatic disadvantages vis-à-vis Western Europe that also impeded investments in infrastructure. India seems to have had a lower degree of consumer demand and lagged behind Western Europe in a number of fields such as mechanical engineering, the level of productive forces, higher education, circulation of useful knowledge, institutional efficiency, upper-class property rights, the nascent bourgeois class consciousness, and inter-communal and proto-national identity formations.
自从肯尼斯·彭慕兰(Kenneth Pomeranz)的开创性著作《大分化》(the Great Divergence, 2000)出版以来,从“全球视角”探讨西方崛起背后可能原因的著作不断涌现。这些研究大多集中在西欧和中国之间的比较。然而,近年来,关于印度和大分化的研究也紧随其后,涉及了自20世纪60年代和70年代关于印度次大陆前殖民时期资本主义发展潜力的辩论激增以来一直不那么突出的研究问题。到目前为止,由于缺乏定量数据,将殖民前的印度与欧洲进行比较以及探索巨大差异背后的潜在原因的努力变得更加复杂。仍然需要对若干南亚区域的社会经济历史进行个案研究,以便对次大陆的发达和不发达区域与欧洲的发达和不发达区域进行系统的比较。然而,现有证据表明,16至18世纪印度的一些“核心地区”在农业生产力、交通设施(旱季期间)、地面部队方面的军事能力(例如迈索尔和马拉地人)、商业和制造能力(特别是纺织、船舶和金属生产)以及商人的社会流动性(例如古吉拉特邦)方面或多或少具有可比较的水平。此外,当欧洲技术对印度有利时,印度的统治者和工匠并不回避采用欧洲技术(例如武器和船只制造)。另一方面,与-à-vis西欧相比,南亚具有一些地理气候方面的不利条件,这也阻碍了对基础设施的投资。印度的消费需求似乎较低,在许多领域落后于西欧,如机械工程、生产力水平、高等教育、有用知识的流通、制度效率、上层阶级的产权、新生的资产阶级阶级意识、社区间和原民族身份的形成。