Rightful Machines and Dilemmas

A. T. Wright
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Tn this paper I set out a new Kantian approach to resolving conflicts and dilemmas of obligation for semi-autonomous machine agents such as self-driving cars. First, I argue that efforts to build explicitly moral machine agents should focus on what Kant refers to as duties of right, or justice, rather than on duties of virtue, or ethics. In a society where everyone is morally equal, no one individual or group has the normative authority to unilaterally decide how moral conflicts should be resolved for everyone. Only public institutions to which everyone could consent have the authority to define, enforce, and adjudicate our rights and obligations with respect to one other. Then, I show how the shift from ethics to a standard of justice resolves the conflict of obligations in what is known as the "trolley problem" for rightful machine agents. Finally, I consider how a deontic logic suitable for governing explicitly rightful machines might meet the normative requirements of justice.
正当机器和困境
在本文中,我提出了一种新的康德方法来解决半自动机器代理(如自动驾驶汽车)的冲突和义务困境。首先,我认为,构建明确的道德机器主体的努力应该关注康德所说的权利义务或正义义务,而不是美德义务或伦理义务。在一个人人在道德上平等的社会中,没有任何个人或团体有规范性的权威来单方面决定如何为每个人解决道德冲突。只有每个人都同意的公共机构才有权定义、执行和裁决我们彼此之间的权利和义务。然后,我展示了从道德到正义标准的转变是如何解决义务冲突的,这就是所谓的“电车问题”,适用于合法的机器代理。最后,我将考虑适用于治理明确合法机器的道义逻辑如何能够满足正义的规范性要求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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