Das Subjekt und das Gegebene: Die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung in der Transzendentalphilosophie und in der Phänomenologie

Abstract

In this article a comparison is made between the way the conditions of possibility of experience are conceived by Husserl and by Kantian and post-Kantian idealism. I show that — contrary to the latter — Husserl claims that the conditions of possibility of experience lie in the factually given sensuous contents, because sensuous syntheses, which are at the basis of the objectual constitution, depend just on the peculiarity and the course of sensuous contents. Because of a conception of the relation between experience and thought that is antithetical to the idealistic one, Husserl holds that only experienceable (i.e., non-intellectual) forms can produce connections, which are not merely thought, but given in experience. What determines the structure of the world is therefore not the thinking or the understanding, but the sensuous given, which is independent from the subjective thought-activity and factual or contingent, since it cannot be traced back to a priori principles. The world-constitution is consequently an irrational fact, namely something that can be described, but not rationally explained.