Cache Pricing Mechanism for ICN in the Scenario of Multiple Content Providers

Abstract

Information-Centric Networking (ICN) has the characteristics of in-network caching, which can reduce the transmission of duplicate traffic, reduce the load on the servers and improve the user experience. From a technical point of view, it is a very promising network architecture. A reasonable pricing mechanism can encourage internet service providers, content providers and users to participate in the operation and use of ICN, and convert ICN technical advantages into economic benefits, thereby promote the large-scale deployment of ICN. The current research focuses on ICN pricing to analyze the pricing mechanism on the internet service provider (ISP) side and the corresponding market equilibrium results. But the model of content providers (CPs) is usually relatively simple in this research. The model assumes the existence of one single CP operator, which will be very different from future deployment scenarios. Multiple CPs will introduce competition and stimulate end users to use ICN networks and ISPs to deploy ICN networks. Moreover, the relationship between CPs is not only competitive but also cooperative. This paper focuses on the complex relationship of competition and cooperation among multiple CPs, solves the non-cooperative game model based on game theory, and studies the interaction between cache and pricing strategies of ICN entities. The optimal cache share of ISPs and the optimal pricing of ISPs and CPs are obtained by establishing the optimal utility function of each entity. Finally, numerical analysis is performed to derive the utility function of ICN entities as the critical pricing and caching parameters change, while verifying the consistency with the equilibrium solution.