Flying Under the Radar? The State and the Enforcement of Labor Laws in Brazil

Abstract

In recent years, developing countries have deregulated, privatized and liberalized their economies. Surprisingly, many of these countries have also retained or even strengthened their labor regulations. To understand how developing nations can ensure reasonable levels of labor protection without compromising the ability of domestic firms to compete in global markets, this paper examines how labor inspectors and prosecutors intervened in four troublesome industries in Brazil: charcoal; sugarcane; small-farming; and fireworks production. It finds that regulatory enforcement agents use their discretion and legal powers to realign incentives, reshape interests, and redistribute the risks, costs and benefits of compliance across an assemblage of public, private and non-profit agents adjacent to the violations. By doing so, they make compliance relatively easy, even desirable. Even more, as they perform this role, these agents become the foot-soldiers of a budding neo-developmental state.