Anti-counterfeiting Method of CAN Terminal Based on Device Physical Fingerprint

Abstract

With the development of science and technology, the electronic control unit (ECU) equipment has gradually become complex, and the security of the controller area network (CAN) bus protocol as the standard protocol for ECU communication has also been higher. In recent years, researchers have conducted extensive research on the security of the CAN bus, such as the anti-counterfeiting attack mechanism based on intrusion detection technology and the authentication code technology, which has improved the security of the CAN bus. However, directly modifying the CAN protocol itself based on intrusion detection technology will cause insufficient backward compatibility and a large number of devices cannot be reused; The authentication code-based approach cannot trace the origin of counterfeit devices and forensic evidence of attack devices, so further improvements are needed. In view of the above two problems, this paper proposes a CAN terminal anti-counterfeiting attack method based on physical fingerprint, which calculates the autocorrelation difference between the collected original signal and the calculated reconstructed signal, and obtains the physical fingerprint of the device as the basis for CAN terminal identity authentication, thereby achieving anti-counterfeiting attack. In this paper, 30 CAN terminals are used to experimentally verify the method in this paper, collect and transmit random data and transfer fixed data CAN frames to form two sets of data sets, and train and test using linear discriminant models, and the final model can identify the device identity rate on the two data sets up to 99%.