Market-based grid resource allocation using a stable continuous double auction

Abstract

A market-based grid resource allocation mechanism is presented and evaluated. It takes into account the architectural features and special requirements of computational grids while ensuring economic efficiency, even when the underlying resources are being used by self-interested and uncooperative participants. A novel stable continuous double auction (SCDA), based on the more conventional continuous double auction (CDA), is proposed for Grid resource allocation. It alleviates the unnecessarily volatile behaviour of the CDA, while maintaining other beneficial features. Experimental results show that the SCDA is superior to the CDA in terms of both economic efficiency and scheduling efficiency. The SCDA delivers continuous matching, high efficiency and low cost, allied with low price volatility and low bidding complexity. Its ability to deliver immediate allocation and its stable prices facilitate co-allocation of resources and it also enables incremental evolution towards a full grid resource market. Effective market-based Grid resource allocation is thus shown to be feasible.