JITScanner: Just-in-Time Executable Page Check in the Linux Operating System

Pasquale Caporaso, Giuseppe Bianchi, F. Quaglia
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Abstract

Modern malware has become increasingly sophisticated, posing a significant threat to cybersecurity. As a result, researchers and security professionals are constantly seeking more advanced methods to detect and analyze malware. Most of these methods are under the umbrella of dynamic analysis, which offers advantages over static analysis—it allows for the observation of the runtime behavior and the detection of obfuscated or encrypted code that may be used to evade detection. However, running executables in a controlled environment can be costly, often leading to a pragmatic compromise of running them with sandboxing only for a limited initial time. In this paper, we propose a different approach to dynamic executable analysis: we analyze the presence of malicious signatures in executable virtual pages of an application the moment they are materialized in RAM—possibly with a new content after an update. We specifically design and evaluate JITScanner, a Linux-oriented package based on a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM), which supports checking any executable page each time its fresh content located in RAM is accessed for instruction fetch enabling the detection of malicious updates to executable pages. The user-level component of the architecture communicates with the LKM via a scalable solution that exploits multi-processor/core technology. We also present experimental data that show the effectiveness of our solution and its promising potential.
JITScanner: Linux操作系统中的实时可执行页面检查
现代恶意软件已经变得越来越复杂,对网络安全构成了重大威胁。因此,研究人员和安全专业人员不断寻求更先进的方法来检测和分析恶意软件。这些方法中的大多数都属于动态分析,动态分析比静态分析更有优势——它允许观察运行时行为,并检测可能用于逃避检测的混淆或加密代码。然而,在受控环境中运行可执行文件的成本可能很高,通常会导致一种务实的妥协,即仅在有限的初始时间内使用沙箱运行它们。在本文中,我们提出了一种不同的动态可执行分析方法:我们在应用程序的可执行虚拟页在ram中具体化的那一刻(可能在更新后具有新内容)分析恶意签名的存在。我们专门设计和评估JITScanner,一个基于可加载内核模块(LKM)的面向linux的包,它支持检查任何可执行页面,每次它位于RAM中的新鲜内容被访问,以获取指令,从而检测可执行页面的恶意更新。该体系结构的用户级组件通过利用多处理器/核心技术的可扩展解决方案与LKM通信。我们还提供了实验数据,证明了我们的解决方案的有效性和前景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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