Attentive Insider Trading

Dallin M. Alldredge, David C. Cicero
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引用次数: 109

Abstract

We provide evidence that some profitable insider stock selling is motivated by public information. At firms that disclose having concentrated sales relationships, insiders appear to sell their own stock profitably based on public information about their principal customers. Supplier insiders also sell more stock when public information about their customers׳ recent returns and earnings surprises suggests they will earn larger profits. These results are stronger when outside investor attention could be lower. Outside of this setting, insiders engage in a higher proportion of routine sales and their sales are less profitable. We do not find similar patterns for insider purchases.
细心的内幕交易
我们提供的证据表明,一些有利可图的内幕股票出售是由公开信息的动机。在披露有集中销售关系的公司中,内部人士似乎根据其主要客户的公开信息出售自己的股票并获利。供应商内部人士也会在有关其客户近期回报和意外收益的公开信息表明他们将获得更大利润时卖出更多股票。当外部投资者关注度较低时,这些业绩会更为强劲。在这个环境之外,内部人员参与的日常销售比例更高,他们的销售利润更低。我们没有发现类似的内幕交易模式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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