Security analysis of SITAR intrusion tolerance system

SSRS '03 Pub Date : 2003-10-31 DOI:10.1145/1036921.1036924
Dazhi Wang, B. Madan, Kishor S. Trivedi
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引用次数: 78

Abstract

Security is an important QoS attribute for characterizing intrusion tolerant computing systems. Frequently however, the security of computing systems is assessed in a qualitative manner based on the presence and absence of certain functional characteristics and security mechanisms. Such a characterization is not only ad hoc, it also lacks rigorous scientific and systematic basis. Some recent research efforts have emphasized the need for a quantitative assessment of security attributes for intrusion tolerant systems. Intrusion tolerant systems are not only complex, but also have to operate in an environment made unpredictable due to the unpredictable actions of bona-fide and non bona-fide users. This makes quantitative security analysis a difficult problem. Earlier approaches to security modelling have been based on the use of Markov models. Capturing details of real architectures in a manually constructed Markov model is difficult. We advocate the use of higher level formalism based on stochastic Petri nets for modelling and quantitative security analysis of intrusion tolerant systems. To validate our approach, we use an experimental intrusion tolerant systems known as the SITAR (scalable intrusion tolerant architecture) currently being implemented jointly at MCNC and Duke University as our target system. It is shown that the resulting analysis is useful in determining gains in security by reconfiguring such a system in terms of increase in redundancy under varying threat levels.
SITAR入侵容忍系统的安全性分析
安全性是表征入侵容忍计算系统的一个重要QoS属性。然而,计算系统的安全性通常是基于某些功能特征和安全机制的存在与否,以定性的方式进行评估的。这样的定性不仅是临时性的,而且缺乏严谨的科学和系统依据。最近的一些研究工作强调了对入侵容忍系统的安全属性进行定量评估的必要性。入侵容忍系统不仅复杂,而且必须在一个由于真实用户和非真实用户的不可预测的行为而变得不可预测的环境中运行。这使得定量安全分析成为一个难题。早期的安全建模方法是基于马尔可夫模型的使用。在手工构建的马尔可夫模型中捕捉真实体系结构的细节是困难的。我们提倡使用基于随机Petri网的高级形式化方法对入侵容忍系统进行建模和定量安全分析。为了验证我们的方法,我们使用了一个实验性的入侵容忍系统,称为SITAR(可扩展的入侵容忍架构),目前正在MCNC和杜克大学联合实施,作为我们的目标系统。结果表明,根据不同威胁级别下冗余的增加,通过重新配置这样的系统来确定安全性的增益,结果分析是有用的。
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