'Confidentially Yours': Restricting Information Flow between Trustees Enhances Trust-Dependent Transactions

Vincent Mak, R. Zwick
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

By extending the traditional trust game to settings involving more than one trustee, we study how restricting information flow between trustees influences trust and reciprocity. We start with a theoretical investigation and then report the results of two experiments designed to examine investor strategy and trustee behavior. Our results suggest that, compared to when information flow is unrestricted, restricting information flow between trustees leads to the following: (a) total investment is larger, (b) the number of trustees receiving positive investment is about the same, and (c) the investor sends out a larger variety of invested amounts to different trustees.
“保密你的”:限制受托人之间的信息流增强依赖于信任的交易
通过将传统的信任博弈扩展到一个以上的受托人,我们研究了限制受托人之间的信息流对信任和互惠的影响。我们从理论调查开始,然后报告两个旨在检查投资者策略和受托人行为的实验结果。我们的研究结果表明,与信息流不受限制时相比,限制受托人之间的信息流导致:(a)总投资更大,(b)接受正向投资的受托人数量大致相同,(c)投资者向不同受托人发放的投资金额种类更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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