Consortium Blockchain based Reputation Incentive Mechanism for Recommendation System

Guo Sun, Tingting Zhao, Qingyi Ye, Chuntang Yu, Xia Feng
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Recommendation systems have been widely used in many e-commerce services, but it is difficult to gather enough participants to supply their recommendations. Moreover, participants in the system may make malicious recommendations, which will affect the accuracy of recommendation results. In order to provide better recommendation service for users, incentive mechanisms are needed to attract more participants in recommendation and curb their malicious behaviors. In this paper, we propose a consortium blockchain based reputation incentive mechanism for recommendation systems(CRIM). Firstly, the monetary rewards are used to attract participants and motivate them to take part in the recommendation. Secondly, we design the incentive mechanism with reputation which is attached to the rewards. Honest participants will gain more rewards while malicious participants will be penalized. Meanwhile, we adopt the Stackelberg game to maximize the utility of participants, and prove that the mechanism can reach a unique Nash equilibrium. Thirdly, the decentralization and immutability of blockchain can guarantee the credibility and security of the stored data, thus ensuring the openness and transparency of the recommendation. Finally, we implement the system for education resources recommendation and conduct experiments, and the results demonstrate that our incentive mechanism is effective and has significant performance when compared with other incentive mechanisms.
基于联盟区块链的推荐系统声誉激励机制
推荐系统已广泛应用于许多电子商务服务中,但很难聚集足够的参与者来提供他们的推荐。此外,系统中的参与者可能会进行恶意推荐,从而影响推荐结果的准确性。为了给用户提供更好的推荐服务,需要激励机制来吸引更多的推荐参与者,遏制他们的恶意行为。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于联盟区块链的推荐系统(CRIM)声誉激励机制。首先,金钱奖励用于吸引参与者,激励他们参与推荐。其次,设计了与奖励挂钩的声誉激励机制。诚实的参与者将获得更多的奖励,而恶意的参与者将受到惩罚。同时,我们采用Stackelberg博弈来最大化参与者的效用,并证明了该机制能够达到唯一的纳什均衡。第三,区块链的去中心化和不可变性可以保证存储数据的可信度和安全性,从而保证推荐的公开透明。最后,我们实施了教育资源推荐系统并进行了实验,结果表明我们的激励机制是有效的,与其他激励机制相比,具有显著的效果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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