Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism

J. Manning
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Cass Sunstein argues that judicial and academic debate about statutory formalism (and its operational arm, textualism) should shift from discussion of first principles to an investigation of the way formalism and antiformalism work in practice. Sunstein, for example, contends that we should compare how well formalism and antiformalism function as market-mimicking default rules, roughly defined as rules that replicate what Congress would have done had it explicitly spoken to a particular interpretive question. Leaving aside the difficult question of how to construct a meaningful empirical test of that counterfactual proposition (formalists think it impossible), one must first ask why that or any other conceivable interpretive value — equity, transparency, coherence, deliberation, lower decision costs, higher decision costs, etc. — should qualify as a proper benchmark for empirical testing. This paper argues that in a limited constitutional democracy, any inquiry into interpretive method must begin with the constitutional structure. That is to say, before testing whether a default rule promotes any particular interpretive value, we must first ascertain whether the Constitution either enjoins or permits the judiciary to recognize such a value as worthy of promotion. It is true, as Sunstein contends, that even state-of-the-art formalists sometimes invite skepticism of such an approach by making overstylized constitutional arguments about the implications of bicameralism and presentment, the requirements of democracy, and the like. Still, the modern formalist's (and, for that matter, antiformalist's) occasional overstatement of the case does not warrant rejection of constitutional analysis in the interpretive debate; if anything, it calls for a more textured inquiry into what the Constitution can or cannot tell us about interpretive method. Such analysis should cast light on the valuable question that Sunstein raised — whether and to what extent empirical analysis might help to assess the competing claims of formalism and antiformalism.
宪法结构与法定形式主义
卡斯·桑斯坦(Cass Sunstein)认为,关于法定形式主义(及其操作部门——文本主义)的司法和学术辩论应该从对基本原则的讨论转向对形式主义和反形式主义在实践中的运作方式的调查。例如,桑斯坦认为,我们应该比较形式主义和反形式主义作为模仿市场的默认规则的作用,粗略地定义为,如果国会明确地对一个特定的解释性问题发表意见,这些规则就会复制国会会做的事情。先不谈如何对反事实命题进行有意义的实证检验这个难题(形式主义者认为这是不可能的),我们必须首先问,为什么这个或任何其他可想象的解释价值——公平、透明、连贯、审议、更低的决策成本、更高的决策成本等——应该成为实证检验的适当基准。本文认为,在有限的宪政民主中,任何对解释方法的探究都必须从宪法结构开始。也就是说,在检验一项默认规则是否促进了任何特定的解释价值之前,我们必须首先确定宪法是否命令或允许司法机构承认这种价值值得促进。正如桑斯坦所主张的那样,即使是最先进的形式主义者有时也会对这种方法提出质疑,因为他们对两院制和议会制的含义、民主的要求等提出了过于程式化的宪法论点。尽管如此,现代形式主义者(以及就此而言,反形式主义者)对案例的偶尔夸大,并不能成为在解释性辩论中拒绝宪法分析的理由;如果说有什么不同的话,那就是需要对宪法在解释方法上能告诉我们什么,不能告诉我们什么进行更有条理的调查。这种分析应该阐明桑斯坦提出的有价值的问题——经验分析是否以及在多大程度上有助于评估形式主义和反形式主义的相互竞争的主张。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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