9. “Dynamic Precaution” in Maintaining Financial Stability: The Importance of FSOC

Jeffrey N. Gordon
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

The Financial Crisis of 2007-09 has shown that financial stability is the ultimate public good: all benefit from it, it is costly to maintain, and its undersupply results in catastrophe. The threat to financial stability comes along four different avenues: first, the effort by institutions within the financial stability regime to find loopholes and other sorts of regulatory arbitrage to avoid the regime’s costs; second, the effort by institutions outside of the regime to produce financial intermediation services that are the functional equivalent of within-the-regime firms; third, “innovation,” which includes the unexpected consequence of existing rules in new application; and fourth, macroeconomic forces that magnify the threat of financial instability. The forces, separately and in combination, can reshape the financial system; these forces can move a formerly stable system into one that is systemically susceptible to either an internal or external shock. One very important lesson of the Financial Crisis is that the maintenance of financial stability is an on-going project that requires an approach of “Dynamic Precaution.” This requires an institution such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council to monitor the financial system as it evolves, to call attention to emerging risks to financial stability, and to catalyze the necessary regulatory intervention. In developing a case for Dynamic Precaution, this chapter explains first, why financial institutions need to remain as the focus of the FSOC regime even while observation and regulation aimed at activities is also important; second, how FSOC can serve Dynamic Precaution by using its designation authority to negotiate “off ramps” from enhanced oversight for firms whose instability or failure would otherwise have systemic implications; and third, if the maintenance of financial stability is the apex goal, why cost-benefit analysis can play only a limited role in financial regulation.
9. “动态预防”在维护金融稳定中的作用:FSOC的重要性
2007年至2009年的金融危机表明,金融稳定是最终的公共利益:所有人都从中受益,维持金融稳定的成本很高,而且金融稳定的供应不足会导致灾难。对金融稳定的威胁来自四个不同的途径:首先,金融稳定机制内的机构努力寻找漏洞和其他类型的监管套利,以避免该机制的成本;第二,体制外机构努力提供与体制内公司功能相当的金融中介服务;第三,“创新”,这包括现有规则在新的应用中产生的意想不到的后果;第四,放大金融不稳定威胁的宏观经济力量。这些力量,无论是单独的还是联合的,都可以重塑金融体系;这些力量可以把一个以前稳定的系统变成一个系统性地容易受到内部或外部冲击的系统。金融危机的一个非常重要的教训是,维持金融稳定是一项持续的工程,需要采取“动态预防”的方法。这需要金融稳定监督委员会(Financial Stability Oversight Council)等机构监督金融体系的演变,提醒人们注意金融稳定面临的新风险,并推动必要的监管干预。在制定动态预防的案例中,本章首先解释了为什么金融机构需要继续作为FSOC制度的重点,即使针对活动的观察和监管也很重要;第二,FSOC如何通过使用其指定权力来谈判“退出”对那些不稳定或失败会产生系统性影响的公司的加强监督;第三,如果维持金融稳定是最高目标,为什么成本效益分析在金融监管中只能发挥有限的作用?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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