Delaware’s Dominance, Wyoming’s Dare. New Challenges, Same Outcome?

Pierluigi Matera
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Despite an increased criticism, Delaware’s dominance has not been experiencing a significant decline: as of today, 67.8% of Fortune 500 companies are still incorporated in this jurisdiction. Nevada is known as Delaware’s most important competitor, with an aggressive strategy that overrode the effort of any other jurisdiction. Yet, its success has been limited to a specific market segment: small firms with low institutional shareholding and high insider ownership. Scholars suggest several explanations for both the rise and the staying power of Delaware. These explanations are essentially subsumed under the credible commitment theory and the network theory. According to the former, investors rely upon Delaware commitment towards the business community; whilst the latter emphasises how Delaware is profiting from the position achieved. The credible commitment theory and the network theory sometimes overlap and combine. Both predict that Delaware is hard to dethrone. In recent years, commentators have argued that this hegemony might be endangered by two different threats: the migration of cases induced by Delaware courts’ response to overlitigation; and the invasive growth of federal regulation—in particular, the possible introduction of a federal incorporation. Yet, criticism and predictions on Delaware’s decline are recurring and always follow the same pattern. Unsurprisingly, the migration turned out to be marginal; and the debate on a federal incorporation was revived in conjunction with a political campaign but fizzled out afterwards. I contend that a mounting challenge to Delaware’s dominance is mostly going off the radar. Wyoming is targeting a new segment of the market for corporate charters: i.e., cryptocurrency businesses. This jurisdiction is attempting to attract these incorporators by enacting liberal legislation and providing their companies with a safe harbour. Wyoming’s aggressive stance provides the motivation to canvass causes and consequences, criticism and challenges to Delaware’s dominance. The investigation might generate insights as to why Wyoming’s strategy will succeed or fail. In fact, this market segmentation approach is the same tactic that Nevada adopted, though Wyoming is applying the strategy to a sector that has meaningful growth potential and is pushing it to the point of introducing exemptions to state securities laws and banking regulation. The application of the credible commitment theory and of the network theory to Wyoming’s approach suggests that the strategy of building a reputation and proving a commitment to tech-incorporators is correct but is also conditioned upon a confluence of events which also needs time. Wyoming should develop an expertise that is too costly to be easily replicated by other jurisdictions and earn a share of the charters market before federal legislature and regulatory bodies pre-empts Wyoming’s law for cryptocurrencies. To the extent that Wyoming’s strategy proves to be effective, it will gain this jurisdiction the lead only in the blockchain segment of the market, whilst Delaware will continue to dominate the rest of it. In light of all this, Wyoming’s approach might be a dare. Yet, it is also the most promising—maybe the only possible—strategy to challenge Delaware’s dominance at the present time. see also https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/03/delawares-dominance-wyomings-dare-blockchain-companies-and-market
特拉华州的优势,怀俄明州的挑战。新的挑战,同样的结果?
尽管受到越来越多的批评,特拉华州的主导地位并没有明显下降:截至今天,67.8%的财富500强公司仍然在这个司法管辖区注册。众所周知,内华达州是特拉华州最重要的竞争对手,其激进的战略压倒了任何其他司法管辖区的努力。然而,它的成功仅限于一个特定的细分市场:机构持股率低、内部人持股率高的小企业。学者们对特拉华州的崛起和持久力提出了几种解释。这些解释基本上归入可信承诺理论和网络理论。根据前者,投资者依赖特拉华州对商界的承诺;而后者则强调特拉华如何从所取得的地位中获利。可信承诺理论和网络理论有时会重叠和结合。两者都预测特拉华州很难被推翻。近年来,评论人士认为,这种霸权可能受到两种不同威胁的威胁:特拉华州法院对过度诉讼的回应引发的案件迁移;以及联邦监管的侵入性增长——特别是可能引入的联邦公司。然而,对特拉华州衰落的批评和预测反复出现,而且总是遵循同样的模式。不出所料,移民结果是微不足道的;在一场政治运动中,关于联邦公司的辩论又复活了,但后来以失败告终。我认为,对特拉华大学主导地位的越来越多的挑战大多是不被关注的。怀俄明州正在瞄准公司包机市场的一个新细分市场:即加密货币业务。这个司法管辖区正试图通过制定宽松的立法,并为他们的公司提供安全港,来吸引这些公司。怀俄明咄咄逼人的姿态提供了对特拉华州主导地位进行原因和后果、批评和挑战的动机。这项调查可能会让我们了解怀俄明州的战略成功或失败的原因。事实上,这种市场细分方法与内华达州采用的策略是一样的,尽管怀俄明州正在将这一策略应用于一个具有重大增长潜力的行业,并将其推向对州证券法和银行监管规定豁免的程度。可信承诺理论和网络理论在怀俄明方法中的应用表明,建立声誉和证明对科技公司的承诺的策略是正确的,但也取决于一系列事件的汇合,这也需要时间。怀俄明州应该开发一种成本太高,无法被其他司法管辖区轻易复制的专业知识,并在联邦立法机构和监管机构抢先制定怀俄明州的加密货币法律之前,在特许市场中占有一席之地。在某种程度上,怀俄明州的战略被证明是有效的,它将只在市场的区块链部分获得这一管辖权,而特拉华州将继续主导其余部分。考虑到这一切,怀俄明州的做法可能是一种挑战。然而,这也是目前最有希望的——也许是唯一可能的——挑战特拉华州主导地位的策略。参见https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2021/03/delawares-dominance-wyomings-dare-blockchain-companies-and-market
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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