The Agency Problem Underlying the Use of Repression

Abstract

State repression is a common tool used by autocrats, and to understand how the implementation of repression unfolds, I develop a theory with two key features. First, uncertainty resulting from political instability creates a novel agency problem between a leader and members of the repressive apparatus. As a consequence of this agency problem, leaders must compensate the repressive apparatus for conducting repression, thus affecting leaders' net benefit of retaining power. Second, political instability and the use of repression comprise an endogenous process that depends on a coordination dynamic between civilians. I show that leaders wanting to implement repression prefer to target civilians that are concentrated - (geographically, economically, or socially) and that the relationship with the capacity to resist is more nuanced. I examine the composition of a repressive government that arises in equilibrium, which has implications for data collection and the design of future empirical studies of government repression.