S. Diesburg, Christopher R. Meyers, M. Stanovich, Michael Mitchell, Justin Marshall, J. Gould, An-I Wang, G. Kuenning
{"title":"TrueErase: per-file secure deletion for the storage data path","authors":"S. Diesburg, Christopher R. Meyers, M. Stanovich, Michael Mitchell, Justin Marshall, J. Gould, An-I Wang, G. Kuenning","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2421013","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The ability to securely delete sensitive data from electronic storage is becoming important. However, current per-file deletion solutions tend to be limited to a segment of the operating system's storage data path or specific to particular file systems or storage media.\n This paper introduces TrueErase, a holistic secure-deletion framework. Through its design, implementation, verification, and evaluation, TrueErase shows that it is possible to build a legacy-compatible full-storage-data-path framework that performs per-file secure deletion and works with common file systems and solid-state storage, while handling common system failures. In addition, this framework can serve as a building block for encryption- and tainting-based secure-deletion systems.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"1999 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"41","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2421013","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 41
Abstract
The ability to securely delete sensitive data from electronic storage is becoming important. However, current per-file deletion solutions tend to be limited to a segment of the operating system's storage data path or specific to particular file systems or storage media.
This paper introduces TrueErase, a holistic secure-deletion framework. Through its design, implementation, verification, and evaluation, TrueErase shows that it is possible to build a legacy-compatible full-storage-data-path framework that performs per-file secure deletion and works with common file systems and solid-state storage, while handling common system failures. In addition, this framework can serve as a building block for encryption- and tainting-based secure-deletion systems.