Dynamic matching market design

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-02-14 DOI:10.1145/2600057.2602887

M. Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, S. Gharan

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引用次数: 76

Abstract

We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions between agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three perspectives: waiting time, optimization, and information. The main insight of our analysis is that waiting to thicken the market can be substantially more important than increasing the speed of transactions, and this is quite robust to the presence of waiting costs. From an optimization perspective, naive local algorithms, that choose the right time to match agents but do not exploit global network structure, can perform very close to optimal algorithms. From an information perspective, algorithms that employ even partial information on agents' departure times perform substantially better than those that lack such information. Information and waiting are complements; information about departure times is necessary for waiting to yield large gains. To elicit agents' departure times, we design an incentive-compatible continuous-time dynamic mechanism without transfers. LINK: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2394319

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动态匹配市场设计

我们引入了一个网络市场动态匹配的简单基准模型，在这个模型中，代理人随机到达和离开，代理人之间可接受的交易网络形成一个随机图。我们从等待时间、优化和信息三个角度对模型进行分析。我们分析的主要观点是，等待以增厚市场可能比提高交易速度更重要，而且这一点在存在等待成本的情况下相当稳健。从优化的角度来看，选择合适时间匹配代理但不利用全局网络结构的天真局部算法，其表现非常接近最优算法。从信息的角度来看，即使是利用部分代理人出发时间信息的算法，其性能也大大优于缺乏此类信息的算法。信息和等待是相辅相成的；要使等待产生巨大收益，就必须要有出发时间的信息。为了获得代理人的出发时间，我们设计了一种与激励相容的无转移连续时间动态机制。链接：www.ssrn.com/abstract=2394319

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Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation

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