The Guardian Council: Parallel Programmable Hardware Security

S. Ainsworth, Timothy M. Jones
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Systems security is becoming more challenging in the face of untrusted programs and system users. Safeguards against attacks currently in use, such as buffer overflows, control-flow integrity, side channels and malware, are limited. Software protection schemes, while flexible, are often too expensive, and hardware schemes, while fast, are too constrained or out-of-date to be practical. We demonstrate the best of both worlds with the Guardian Council, a novel parallel architecture to enforce a wide range of highly customisable and diverse security policies. We leverage heterogeneity and parallelism in the design of our system to perform security enforcement for a large high-performance core on a set of small microcontroller-sized cores. These Guardian Processing Elements (GPEs) are many orders of magnitude more efficient than conventional out-of-order superscalar processors, bringing high-performance security at very low power and area overheads. Alongside these highly parallel cores we provide fixed-function logging and communication units, and a powerful programming model, as part of an architecture designed for security. Evaluation on a range of existing hardware and software protection mechanisms, reimplemented on the Guardian Council, demonstrates the flexibility of our approach with negligible overheads, out-performing prior work in the literature. For instance, 4 GPEs can provide forward control-flow integrity with 0% overhead, while 6 GPEs can provide a full shadow stack at only 2%.
监护委员会:并行可编程硬件安全
面对不受信任的程序和系统用户,系统安全性变得越来越具有挑战性。目前使用的针对攻击的防护措施,如缓冲区溢出、控制流完整性、侧通道和恶意软件,都是有限的。软件保护方案虽然灵活,但往往过于昂贵,而硬件方案虽然快速,但太受限制或过时而不实用。我们通过Guardian Council展示了两全其美的优点,这是一种新的并行架构,用于执行广泛的高度可定制和多样化的安全策略。我们利用系统设计中的异构性和并行性,在一组小型微控制器大小的核心上为大型高性能核心执行安全强制。这些守护处理元素(Guardian Processing Elements, gpe)的效率比传统的无序超标量处理器高出许多数量级,以非常低的功耗和面积开销带来高性能的安全性。除了这些高度并行的内核外,我们还提供固定功能的日志记录和通信单元,以及强大的编程模型,作为专为安全性设计的体系结构的一部分。对一系列现有硬件和软件保护机制的评估,在监护委员会上重新实施,证明了我们方法的灵活性,开销可以忽略不计,优于文献中的先前工作。例如,4个gpe可以以0%的开销提供前向控制流完整性,而6个gpe可以仅以2%的开销提供完整的阴影堆栈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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