Location Tracking Attack in Ad hoc Networks based on Topology Information

Abstract

Unlike in conventional networks, node positions in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) usually change over time. As a side effect of managing routes, routing protocols to some extent also disseminate neighborship and topology information in the network, thereby disclosing at least some information on a node's own position to other nodes. Due to the wireless nature of ad hoc networks, this information can become available even to third parties which are not participating in the network. Using this information, location profiling may become possible, where attackers gather information on node positions or mobility patterns. This information may then be used for anything ranging from targeted advertisement to criminal activities. Therefore, location privacy is an important issue in ad hoc networks. In this paper, we analyze to what extent an attacker can track the precise location of a node, assuming a powerful attacker model where an attacker knows all neighbor relationships plus information on node distances. We present a new approach which uses these information and uses geometric constraints and heuristics to find node positions efficiently. The quality of our results is discussed and compared to other approaches. Based on the localization precision that such an "omniscient" attacker can reach, we will be able to evaluate the quality of future, more realistic attack models